Is this as scary as I think it is or is it just the usual paranoid conspiracy theory? And does the USA really have no auditors to stop potential electoral corruption?

All the President's votes?

Tom

Actively enjoying it all

Makes complete sense. When the history of the noughties is written, Bush will most likely come out as the most corrupt slayer of liberty and democracy since, well, since I don't know.... It's Thatcher on steroids.

In the UK, so far as I can remember, all the disturbing allegations of vote spoiling and rigging in the last Presidental elections just went away. Funny that.

Or have I got it all wrong?

I can speak to the technology, having performed due diligence on it prior to consolidating 2 companies in the e-balloting* industry (I was the lowly analyst intern ). Yes, there are MAJOR problems with all of the new technologies, all definitely exposing huge potential for electoral corruption.

I've also kept track of the roll-out of these technologies across the nation since the last election, and it's scary to think how much easier it could be for Bush to steal his second presidency.

Okay, off to buy Krugman's uplifting new book...

* Both companies were aiming to become voting infrastructure companies but due to the same government certification mentioned in the article, we thought it best they focus on balloting. Apparently if you're a large, well-funded company certification doesn't matter- something we learned to be 100% factual shortly after the merger.

Tom,

if you don't read the papers and don't watch TV, how did you find this article?

I read this in the paper at the time. I love the Catch 22 scenario whereby it is actually illegal to question the integrity of the system if you belive it to have been illegally tampered with!

Bruce

I believe the Independent article is somewhat sensational.

A more rigorous study by the Caltech/MIT voting technology project concludes that electronic systems (along with optical scanners) are the most reliable.

Punch card systems, though, have serious problems, as the 2002 presidential elections showed.

Cheers,

Steven

Of course the article is sensational but the main thrust of the arguement is worrying. The only computer firms offering the new technology are known Republican supporters who are bank rolling the Republican party. They have signed a deal making it illegal to investigate any suspected illegal tampering with the computer software or even unintentional faults with the hardware or software and they have removed any form of independent audit trail.

In effect the only people who can persue any irregularities intentional or otherwise, are the very people who are likely to make them and the American voting public have no legal comeback. Is that the democracy you want?

Tom

Actively enjoying it all

The article implies that Republican system vendors will sell biased machines to Republican politicians. The reality in the U.S. is more complex: Decisions are made at the state level, where there are nearly as many Democrats.

In any event, if any group of voters feels disenfranchised, a suitable interest group will file suit pursuant to the Voting Rights Act.

quote:

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Originally posted by Madrid:
A more rigorous study by the Caltech/MIT voting technology project...

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I'm glad you brought that up- it refreshed my memory. Overall, a decent study and it largely coincides with my findings (from 1999). I'm a lot tougher on the security and tampering issues with the new technology than those lightweights from MIT and Caltech though.

Caltech/MIT summary

This topic has been receiving a bit of press lately, mostly because of a few lawsuits.

First, from a recent WSJ story "Electronic Voting Is Not As Simple As It Looks":

"...Democracy is based on trust. You turn up to vote because you think the procedure isn't rigged. But your trust isn't blind: You want to know that the process is monitored by independent folk who understand how the system works, and who you trust to keep an eye on things for you.

With electronic voting, all this gets harder, not easier. The more digitized you make voting, the more complicated it gets, the harder it is to monitor, and the easier it is to mess with it. Some ne'er-do-well could tamper with the smart card he is given to vote with, and cast multiple votes. An election official could replace the memory cards storing the tally with one of his own. A hacker could break into the computer storing the votes and alter the outcome. Election monitors would see none of this, or else they might, but just not know what they were seeing. You get the picture? Electronic voting is not as simple as it looks. And after all that, you still need a paper trail that people can go back to if, for any reason, the electronic system -- or voters' faith in it -- breaks down.

Which is where our story begins. It starts with Bev Harris, a 52-year-old grandmother from Renton (population: 50,000), just south of Seattle, who was getting interested in the whole e-voting thing. What she found out quickly was that it's all very secret. There are a handful of companies making voting machines in the United States, and none of them is about to hand over its equipment for public scrutiny. Their argument: "security through obscurity." In other words, if people don't know how something works, that makes it secure.

Anyway, Ms. Harris started looking around the Internet and came across the homepage of Global Elections Systems Inc. -- a voting-equipment maker bought out by rival Diebold Inc. in 2001 -- which included a link to an FTP site (FTP is a way to download files from one computer to another). There she came across 40,000 files, all unprotected by any password. After some agonizing, she downloaded them all to her computer -- it took 44 hours -- and started rummaging through them.

All this happened early this year. She sent the files to experts, academics, activists and journalists, who started picking through the material, which was quickly posted around the Internet. What they discovered was somewhat scary: The voting system inherited from Global Elections Systems by Diebold seemed to have some serious flaws: A fair bit of it was based on off-the-shelf programs, such as Microsoft Office, and had dubious security features; a study by Johns Hopkins University tested the software from the FTP site and concluded "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts." Douglas W. Jones of the University of Iowa, who had tested a predecessor of the Diebold system in 1997, realized that no one had taken note of his dire warnings then that the machines used a woefully inadequate encryption system. His conclusion: "entirely unacceptable." An independent study done for one of Diebold's clients, the state of Maryland, concluded: "The system, as implemented in policy, procedure and technology, is at high risk of compromise."

All pretty scary, particularly if you take into account electronic voting is no longer a pipe dream. South Korea will introduce electronic voting for all elections from 2005. Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Australia have launched pilot projects. Companies like Diebold are moving fast to take advantage of some $4 billion of U.S. federal funding for states to replace their old punch-card and lever-voting machines. This before any oversight committee has been formed to set any standards for certifying the machines (including for example, the need for a paper back-up). Diebold already has some 33,000 touch-screen machines in place throughout the U.S., and, along with its competitors, is aggressively pursuing a promising market..."

And now a lawsuit filed by Diebold.